This paper proposes the first inner product encryption (IPE) scheme that is adaptively secure and fully attribute-hiding (attribute-hiding in the sense of the definition by Katz, Sahai and Waters), while the existing IPE schemes are either fully attribute-hiding but selectively secure or adaptively secure but weakly attribute-hiding. The proposed IPE scheme is proven to be adaptively secure and fully attribute-hiding under the decisional linear assumption in the standard model. The IPE scheme is comparably as efficient as the existing attribute-hiding IPE schemes. We also present a variant of the proposed IPE scheme with the same security that achieves shorter public and secret keys. A hierarchical IPE scheme can be constructed that is also adaptively secure and fully attribute-hiding under the same assumption. In this paper, we extend the dual system encryption technique by Waters into a more general manner, in which new forms of ciphertext and secret keys are employed and new types of information theoretical tricks are introduced along with several forms of computational reduction.
Introduction

Background
Functional encryption (FE) is an advanced class of encryption and it covers identity-based encryption (IBE) [3, 4, 8, 14] , hidden-vector encryption (HVE) [10] , inner-product encryption (IPE) [19] , predicate encryption (PE) and attribute-based encryption (ABE) [2, 17, 26, 20, 25, 27, 23] . In FE, there is a relation R (v, x) which determines what a secret key with parameter v can decrypt a ciphertext encrypted under parameter x. The enhanced functionality and flexibility provided by FE systems are very appealing for many practical applications.
For some applications, the parameters for encryption are required to be hidden from ciphertexts. One of such applications is an advanced notion of PKE with keyword search (PEKS) [7] , which we call PKE with functional search (PEFS) in this paper. In PEFS, a parameter x (not just a keyword) embedded in a ciphertext is searched (checked) whether R(v, x) holds or not by using a secret key with parameter v. Here, keyword search is a special case of functional search R(v, x) when R(v, x) ⇔ [x = v] . Parameter x of a ciphertext is often private information and should be hidden from ciphertexts in such applications.
To capture the security requirement, Katz, Sahai and Waters [19] introduced attribute-hiding (based on the same notion for HVE by Boneh and Waters [10] ), a security notion for FE that is stronger than the basic security requirement, payload-hiding. Roughly speaking, attributehiding requires that a ciphertext conceal the associated parameter as well as the plaintext, while payload-hiding only requires that a ciphertext conceal the plaintext. Attribute-hiding FE is often called predicate encryption (PE).
The widest class of relations of a FE system in the literature is general non-monotone (span program) relations, which can be expressed using AND, OR, Threshold and NOT gates [23] . FE systems supporting such a wide class of relations, however, have one limitation in that the parameter x of the ciphertext should be revealed to users to decrypt. That is, such FE systems do not satisfy the attribute-hiding security.
To the best of our knowledge, the widest class of relations supported by attribute-hiding FE systems are inner-product predicates in [19, 20, 23] , which we call the KSW08, LOS + 10 and OT10 schemes. Parameters of inner-product predicates are expressed as vectors x (for a ciphertext) and v (for a secret key), where R( v, x) holds iff v · x = 0. (Here, v · x denotes the standard inner-product.) In this paper we call FE for inner-product predicates inner product encryption (IPE).
Inner-product predicates represent a fairly wide class of relations including equality tests as the simplest case (i.e., anonymous IBE and HVE are very special classes of attribute-hiding IPE), disjunctions or conjunctions of equality tests, and, more generally, CNF or DNF formulas. We note, however, that inner product predicates are less expressive than general (even monotone span program) relations of FE. To use inner product predicates for such general relations, formulas must be written in CNF or DNF form, which can cause a super-polynomial blowup in size for arbitrary formulas.
Among the existing attribute-hiding IPEs, the KSW08 IPE scheme [19] is proven to be only selectively secure. Although the LOS + 10 and OT10 IPE schemes [20, 23] are proven to be adaptively secure, the achieved attribute-hiding security is limited or weaker than that defined in [19] . Here, we call the attribute-hiding security defined in [19] fully attribute-hiding and that achieved in [20, 23] weakly attribute-hiding. In the fully attribute-hiding security definition [19] , adversary A is allowed to ask a key-query for v such that v · x (0) = v · x (1) = 0 provided that m (0) = m (1) (b) and m (b) (b = 0, 1) are for the challenge ciphertext in the security definition), while in the weakly attribute-hiding security definition [20, 23] , A is only allowed to ask a key-query for v such that v · x (b) = 0 for all b ∈ {0, 1}.
Let us explain the difference between the fully and weakly attribute-hiding definitions in a PEFS system. User Alice provides her secret key, sk v , to proxy server Bob, who checks whether v · x = 0 or not for an incoming ciphertext, ct x , encrypted with parameter x. In the weakly attribute-hiding security, privacy of x from ct x is ensured only if v · x = 0, but cannot be ensured or some privacy on x may be revealed if v · x = 0. Here note that there still exists (n − 1)-dimensional freedom (or room of privacy) of n-dimensional vector x, even if v and the fact that v · x = 0 is revealed. , and x express ciphertext attribute (Subject = X, Receiver = Alice). In this case, v · x = 0, since the ciphertext attribute expressed by x satisfies the formula expressed by v. Although Bob knows sk v and v, Bob has no idea which attribute x is embedded in ct x except that the ciphertext attribute satisfies the formula, i.e., v · x = 0, if the fully attribute-hiding security is achieved. On the other hand, Bob may obtain some additional information on the attribute (e.g., Bob may know that the subject is X, not Y ), if only the weakly attribute-hiding security is guaranteed.
The KSW08 IPE scheme is fully attribute-hiding but selectively secure, and the LOS + 10 and OT10 IPE schemes are adaptively secure but weakly attribute-hiding. Therefore, there is no IPE scheme that is adaptively secure and fully attribute-hiding simultaneously. As for a more limited class of schemes, HVE (as mentioned above, HVE is a very special class of attribute-hiding IPE), an adaptively secure and fully attribute-hiding HVE scheme has been proposed [13] . For hierarchical IPE (HIPE), the LOS + 10 and OT10 HIPE schemes [20, 23] are adaptively secure but weakly attribute-hiding, i.e., there is no HIPE scheme that is adaptively secure and fully attribute-hiding simultaneously.
It is a technically challenging task to achieve an adaptively secure and fully attribute-hiding (H)IPE scheme. Even if we use the powerful dual system encryption technique by Waters, the main difficulty resides in how to change a (normal) secret key queried with v to a semi-functional secret key, without knowing x (b) (b = 0, 1) for the challenge ciphertext, i.e., without knowing whether v · x (b) = 0 or not, since an adversary may issue key queries with v before issuing the challenge ciphertext query with x (b) (b = 0, 1) and two possible cases, v · x (b) = 0 (for all b ∈ {0, 1}) and v · x (b) = 0 (for all b ∈ {0, 1}), are allowed in fully attribute-hiding IPE. Note that in weakly attribute-hiding IPE, it is always required that v · x (b) = 0. At a first glance, it looks hard to achieve it, since the form of semi-functional secret key may be different (e.g., canceled or randomized) depending on whether v · x (b) = 0 or not. Another technically challenging target in this paper is to prove the security under the decisional linear (DLIN) assumption (on prime order pairing groups) in the standard model.
Our Results
This paper proposes the first IPE scheme that is adaptively secure and fully attribute-hiding simultaneously. The proposed IPE scheme is proven to be adaptively secure and fully attributehiding under the DLIN assumption in the standard model (Section 4). We also present a variant of the proposed IPE scheme with the same security that achieves shorter master public keys and shorter secret keys (Section 5). A hierarchical IPE (HIPE) scheme can be realized that is also adaptively secure and fully attribute-hiding under the same assumption. Table 2 in Section 6 compares the proposed IPE schemes with several existing attribute-hiding IPE schemes.
Key Techniques
To overcome the above-mentioned difficulty, we extend the dual system encryption technique into a more general manner, in which various forms of ciphertext and secret keys are introduced ('normal', 'temporal 0', 'temporal 1', 'temporal 2' and 'unbiased' forms for a ciphertext, and 'normal', 'temporal 1' and 'temporal 2' forms for a secret key), and new types (Types 1, 2, 3) of information theoretical tricks are employed with several forms of computational reduction (the security of Problems 1, 2 and 3 to DLIN). See Table 1 and Figure 1 in Section 4.3.2 for the outline.
In our approach, all forms ('normal', 'temporal 1' and 'temporal 2') of a secret key do not depend on whether v · x (b) = 0 or not. Although the aim of a 'semi-functional' secret key in the original dual system encryption method is to randomize the semi-functional part, the aim of these forms of a secret-key in our approach is just to encode v in a (hidden) subspace for a secret-key.
Another key point in our approach is that we transform a challenge ciphertext to an 'unbiased' ciphertext whose advantage is 0 in the final game, and x (b) is randomized to a random vector in a two-dimensional subspace, span x (0) , x (1) . In contrast, x (b) is randomized to a random vector in the n-dimensional whole space, F n q , in [20, 23] for weakly attribute-hiding IPE based on the original dual system encryption technique.
Therefore, in our approach, only v is encoded in a (hidden) subspace of the temporal forms of a secret-key, and a random vector in span x (0) , x (1) is encoded in the corresponding (hidden) subspace for the temporal and unbiased forms of a ciphertext.
To realize this approach, our construction is based on the dual pairing vector spaces (DPVS) (Section 2) [20, 23] . A nice property of DPVS is that we can set a hidden linear subspace by concealing the basis of a subspace from the public key. Typically, a pair of dual (or orthonormal) bases, B and B * , are randomly generated using random linear transformation, and a part of B (sayB) is used as a public key and the corresponding part of B * (sayB * ) is used as a secret key or trapdoor. Therefore, the basis, B −B, is information theoretically concealed against an adversary, i.e., even an infinite power adversary has no idea on which basis is selected as B −B whenB is published. It provides a framework for information theoretical tricks in the public-key setting.
In the proposed (basic) IPE scheme, span B and span B * , are (4n + 2)-dimensional (where the dimension of inner-product vectors is n), and, as for public parameterB, span B is (2n+2)-dimensional, i.e., the basis for the remaining 2n-dimensional space is information theoretically concealed (ambiguous). We use the 2n-dimensional hidden subspace to realize the various forms of ciphertext and secret keys and make elaborate game transformations over these forms towards the final goal, the 'unbiased' ciphertext.
The game transformations are alternating over computational and conceptual (information theoretical), and the combinations of three types of information theoretical tricks and three computational tricks (Problems 1, 2 and 3) play a central role in our approach, as shown in Figure 1 . Type 1 is a (conceptual) linear transformation inside a (hidden) subspace for a ciphertext, Type 2 is a (conceptual) linear transformation inside a (hidden) subspace for a ciphertext with preserving the corresponding secret key value, and Type 3 is a (conceptual) linear transformation across (hidden and partially public) subspaces. The security of Problems 1, 2 and 3 is reduced to the DLIN assumption.
See Section 4.3.2 for the details of our techniques, in which the game transformations as well as the form changes of ciphertext and secret keys are summarized in Table 1 
Notations
When A is a random variable or distribution, y R ← A denotes that y is randomly selected from A according to its distribution. When A is a set, y U ← A denotes that y is uniformly selected from A. y := z denotes that y is set, defined or substituted by z. When a is a fixed value, A(x) → a (e.g., A(x) → 1) denotes the event that machine (algorithm) A outputs a on input x. A function f : N → R is negligible in λ, if for every constant c > 0, there exists an integer n such that f (λ) < λ −c for all λ > n.
We denote the finite field of order q by F q , and F q \ {0} by F × q . A vector symbol denotes a vector representation over F q , e.g., x denotes (
The vector 0 is abused as the zero vector in F n q for any n. X T denotes the transpose of matrix X. I denotes the × identity matrix. A bold face letter denotes an element of vector space V, e.g., x ∈ V. When In this paper, we concentrate on the symmetric version of dual pairing vector spaces [21, 22] . constructed by using symmetric bilinear pairing groups given in Definition 1. For the asymmetric version of DPVS, (q, V, V * , G T , A, A * , e), see Appendix A.2. The following symmetric version is obtained by identifying V = V * and A = A * in the asymmetric version.
Definition 2 "Dual pairing vector spaces (DPVS
where a i := ( 3 Definitions of (Hierarchical) Inner Product Encryption
Definition of Inner-Product Encryption (IPE)
This section defines predicate encryption (PE) for the class of inner-product predicates, i.e., inner product encryption (IPE) and its security.
An attribute of inner-product predicates is expressed as a vector x ∈ F n q \{ 0} and a predicate f v is associated with a vector v, where f v ( x) = 1 iff v · x = 0. Let Σ := F n q \ { 0}, i.e., the set of the attributes, and F := {f v | v ∈ F n q \ { 0}} i.e., the set of the predicates.
Definition 4
An inner product encryption scheme (for predicates F and attributes Σ) consists of probabilistic polynomial-time algorithms Setup, KeyGen, Enc and Dec. They are given as follows:
• Setup takes as input security parameter 1 λ outputs (master) public key pk and (master) secret key sk.
• KeyGen takes as input the master public key pk, secret key sk, and predicate vector v. It outputs a corresponding secret key sk v .
• Enc takes as input the master public key pk, plaintext m in some associated plaintext space, msg, and attribute vector x. It returns ciphertext ct x .
• Dec takes as input the master public key pk, secret key sk v and ciphertext ct x . It outputs either plaintext m or the distinguished symbol ⊥.
An IPE scheme should have the following correctness property: for all (pk, sk)
Otherwise, it holds with negligible probability.
We then define the security notion of IPE, that was called "adaptively secure and fully attribute-hiding" in Abstract and Section 1. Since we will deal with only this security notion hereafter, we shortly call it "adaptively attribute-hiding." 
Definition 5
3.
A outputs challenge attribute vector ( x (0) , x (1) ) and challenge plaintexts (m (0) , m (1) ), subject to the following restrictions:
• v · x (0) = 0 and v · x (1) = 0 for all the key queried predicate vectors, v.
• Two challenge plaintexts are equal, i.e., m (0) = m (1) , and any key query v satisfies
e., one of the following conditions. (1) , and s := 1 otherwise.
Definition of Hierarchical Inner-Product Encryption (HIPE)
This section defines hierarchical inner product encryption (HIPE) and its security.
In a delegation system, it is required that a user who has a capability can delegate to another user a more restrictive capability. In addition to this requirement, our hierarchical inner-product encryption introduces a format of hierarchy n to define common delegation structure in a system.
We 
, where the union is a disjoint union. Then,
Let the space of hierarchical predicates A HIPE scheme should have the following correctness property: for all correctly generated pk and sk
Otherwise, m = m except for negligible probability.
For f and f in F, we denote f ≤ f if the predicate vector for f is a prefix of that for f . For the following definition for key queries, see [28] .
Definition 7 The model for defining the adaptively attribute-hiding security of HIPE against adversary A (under chosen plaintext attacks) is given as follows:
A may adaptively makes a polynomial number of queries of the following type:
• 
A outputs challenge attribute vectors
h (1) ) and challenge plaintexts m (0) , m (1) , subject to the following restrictions:
• f (X (0) ) = f (X (1) ) = 0 for all the reveal key queried predicate f .
• Two challenge plaintexts are equal, i.e., m (0) = m (1) and reveal key queried predicate
, one of the following conditions.
The adversary may continue to request keys for additional predicate vectors subject to the restriction given in step 3.
A is given a reply as in step 2.
A outputs a bit b , and succeeds if b = b.
The advantage of A in the above game is defined as Adv 
Remark 1
In the definition, the levels h (0) and h (1) of the two challenge vectors given by an adversary, (
The proposed HIPE scheme only satisfies the security definition under the restriction that h (0) = h (1) . Here, this restricted security ensures the anonymity of attributes of a ciphertext but with revealing the number of levels of attributes, while the above security definition ensures the anonymity of attributes as well as the number of levels. (The HIPE scheme in [20] satisfies the unrestricted security.) Our HIPE scheme can be modified to satisfy the unrestricted security as: when generating a ciphertext in Enc, input vectors (
.., are padded with random vectors ( x i ) i= +1,...,d for a maximum level d, in the same manner as the HIPE in [20] .
Proposed (Basic) IPE Scheme
Dual Orthonormal Basis Generator
We describe random dual orthonormal basis generator G IPE ob below, which is used as a subroutine in the proposed IPE scheme.
Construction
In the description of the scheme, we assume that the first coordinate, x 1 , of input vector,
is defined at the end of Section 2. We refer to Section 1.4 for notations on DPVS.
Security
Main Theorem (Theorem 1) and Main Lemma (Lemma 1)
Theorem 1 The proposed IPE scheme is adaptively attribute-hiding against chosen plaintext attacks under the DLIN assumption. For any adversary A, there exist probabilistic machines
, whose running times are essentially the same as that of A, such that for any security parameter λ, Proof. First, we execute a preliminary game transformation from Game 0 (original security game in Definition 5) to Game 0', which is the same as Game 0 except that flip a coin t U ← {0, 1} before setup, and the game is aborted in step 3 if t = s. We define that A wins with probability 1/2 when the game is aborted (and the advantage in Game 0' is Pr[A wins ] − 1/2 as well). Since t is independent from s, the game is aborted with probability 1/2. Hence, the advantage in Game 0' is a half of that in Game 0, i.e., Adv
in Game 0' since t is uniformly and independently generated.
As for the conditional probability with t = 0, it holds that, for any adversary A, there exist probabilistic machines E 1 and E 2 , whose running times are essentially the same as that of A, such that for any security parameter λ, in Game 0',
where E 2-h (·) := E 2 (h, ·) and ν is the maximum number of A's key queries and := (6ν + 5)/q. This is obtained in the same manner as the weakly attribute-hiding security of the OT10 IPE in the full version of [23] : Since the difference between our IPE and the OT10 IPE is only the dimension of the hidden subspaces, i.e., the former has 2n and the latter has n, the weakly attribute-hiding security of the OT10 IPE implies the security with t = 0 of our IPE.
As for the conditional probability with t = 1, i.e., Pr[A wins | t = 1], Lemma 1 (Eq. (1)) holds. Therefore,
(λ) + , where := (29ν + 17)/q.
Lemma 1 (Main Lemma)
For any adversary A, there exist probabilistic machines E 1 , E 2-1 and E 2-2 , whose running times are essentially the same as that of A, such that for any security parameter λ, in Game 0' (described in the proof of Theorem 1),
where
, ν is the maximum number of A's key queries and := (23ν + 12)/q.
Proof Outline of Lemma 1
At the top level strategy of the security proof, an extended form of the dual system encryption by Waters [29] is employed, where ciphertexts and secret keys have three forms, normal, temporal 1 and temporal 2. The real system uses only normal ciphertexts and normal secret keys, and temporal 1 and 2 ciphertexts and keys are used only in a sequence of security games for the security proof. (Additionally, ciphertexts have temporal 0 and unbiased forms. See below.) To prove this lemma, we only consider the t = 1 case. We employ Game 0' (described in the proof of Theorem 1) through Game 3. In Game 1, the challenge ciphertext is changed to temporal 0 form. When at most ν secret key queries are issued by an adversary, there are 4ν game changes from Game 1 (Game 2-0-4), Game 2-1-1, Game 2-1-2, Game 2-1-3, Game 2-1-4 through Game 2-ν-1, Game 2-ν-2, Game 2-ν-3, Game 2-ν-4. In Game 2-h-1, the challenge ciphertext is changed to temporal 1 form, and the first h − 1 keys are temporal 2 form, while the remaining keys are normal. In Game 2-h-2, the h-th key is changed to temporal 1 form while the remaining keys and the challenge ciphertext is the same as in Game 2-h-1. In Game 2-h-3, the challenge ciphertext is changed to temporal 2 form while all the queried keys are the same as in Game 2-h-2. In Game 2-h-4, the h-th key is changed to temporal 2 form while the remaining keys and the challenge ciphertext is the same as in Game 2-h-3. At the end of the Game 2 sequence, in Game 2-ν-4, all the queried keys are temporal 2 forms (and the challenge ciphertext is temporal 2 form), which allows the next conceptual change to Game 3. In Game 3, the challenge ciphertext is changed to unbiased form (while all the queried keys are temporal 2 form). In the final game, advantage of the adversary is zero.
We summarize these changes in Table 1 , where shaded parts indicate the challenge ciphertext or queried key(s) which were changed in a game from the previous game As usual, we prove that the advantage gaps between neighboring games are negligible.
For ct x := (c 1 , c 2 ), we focus on c 1 , and ignore the other part of ct x , i.e., c 2 , (and call c 1 ciphertext) in this proof outline. In addition, we ignore a negligible factor in the (informal) descriptions of this proof outline. For example, we say "A is bounded by B" when A ≤ B + (λ) where (λ) is negligible in security parameter λ.
A normal secret key, k * norm (with vector v), is the correct form of the secret key of the proposed IPE scheme, and is expressed by Eq. (2). Similarly, a normal ciphertext (with vector x), c norm , is expressed by Eq. (7) and a temporal 2 secret key, k * temp2 , is expressed by Eq. (8) . An unbiased ciphertext, c unbias We then show that Game 2-(h − 1)-4 can be conceptually changed to Game 2-h-1 (Lemma 7), by using the fact that parts of bases, (b n+1 , . . . , b 2n ) and (b * n+1 , . . . , b * 2n ), are unknown to the adversary. In particular, when h = 1, it means that Game 1 can be conceptually changed to Game 2-1-1. When h ≥ 2, we notice that temporal 2 key and temporal 1 challenge ciphertext, (k * temp2 , c temp1 1 ), are equivalent to temporal 2 key and temporal 2 challenge ciphertext,
. This change of coefficient vectors can be done conceptually since zero vector 0 n is used for the corresponding part in k * temp2 .
The advantage gap between Games 2-h-1 and 2-h-2 is shown to be bounded by the advantage of Problem 2, i.e., advantage of the DLIN assumption (Lemmas 8 and 3).
We then show that Game 2-h-2 can be conceptually changed to Game 2-h-3 (Lemma 9), again by using the fact that parts of bases, (b n+1 , . . . , b 2n ) and (b * n+1 , . . . , b * 2n ), are unknown to the adversary. In this conceptual change, we use the fact that all key queries v satisfy
Here, we notice that temporal 1 key and temporal 1 challenge ciphertext, (k * temp1 , c temp1 1 ), are equivalent to temporal 1 key and temporal 2 challenge ciphertext, (k * temp1 , c temp2 1
. This conceptual change is proved by using Lemma 5.
The advantage gap between Games 2-h-3 and 2-h-4 is similarly shown to be bounded by the advantage of Problem 3, i.e., advantage of the DLIN assumption (Lemmas 10 and 4).
We then show that Game 2-ν-4 can be conceptually changed to Game 3 (Lemma 11) by using the fact that parts of bases, (b n+1 , . . . , b 3n ) and (b * 1 , . . . , b * 2n ), are unknown to the adversary. Figure 1 shows the structure of the security reduction, where the security of the scheme is hierarchically reduced to the intractability of the DLIN problem. The reduction steps indicated by dotted arrows can be shown in the same manner as that in (the full version of) [23] .
Proof of Lemma 1
To prove Lemma 1, we consider the following 4ν + 3 games when t = 1. In Game 0', a part framed by a box indicates coefficients to be changed in a subsequent game. In the other games, a part framed by a box indicates coefficients which were changed in a game from the previous game.
Game 0' : Same as Game 0 except that flip a coin t U ← {0, 1} before setup, and the game is aborted in step 3 if t = s. In order to prove Lemma 1, we consider the case with t = 1. The reply to a key query for v is:
where σ
The challenge ciphertext for challenge plaintext m := m (0) = m (1) and vectors ( x (0) , x (1) ) is:
where b
Here, we note that c 2 is independent from bit b.
Game 1 : Game 1 is the same as Game 0' except that c 1 of the challenge ciphertext for (challenge plaintext m := m (0) = m (1) and) vectors ( x (0) , x (1) ) is: (1) ) is:
where ω , ω 0 , ω 1 U ← F q and all the other variables are generated as in Game 2-(h − 1)-4.
Game 2-h-2 (h = 1, . . . , ν) : Game 2-h-2 is the same as Game 2-h-1 except that the reply to the h-th key query for v is:
where σ U ← F q and all the other variables are generated as in Game 2-h-1.
Game 2-h-3 (h = 1, . . . , ν) : Game 2-h-3 is the same as Game 2-h-2 except that c 1 of the challenge ciphertext for (challenge plaintexts m := m (0) = m (1) and) vectors ( x (0) , x (1) ) is:
where ω 0 , ω 1 U ← F q and all the other variables are generated as in Game 2-h-2.
Game 2-h-4 (h = 1, . . . , ν) : Game 2-h-4 is the same as Game 2-h-3 except that the reply to the h-th key query for v is:
where σ U ← F q and all the other variables are generated as in Game 2-h-3.
Game 3 : Game 3 is the same as Game 2-ν-4 except that c 1 of the challenge ciphertext for (challenge plaintexts m := m (0) = m (1) and) vectors ( x (0) , x (1) ) is:
where ω 0 , ω 1 U ← F q and all the other variables are generated as in Game 2-ν-4. Here, we note that c 1 is independent from bit b
(λ) and Adv A (λ) is equivalent to the lefthand side of Eq. (1). We will show six lemmas (Lemmas 6-11) that evaluate the gaps between pairs of neighboring games. From these lemmas and Lemmas 2-4, we obtain Adv , n) , where
Lemmas 2-12
Definition 8 (Problem 1) Problem 1 is to guess
. For a probabilistic adversary B, the advantage of B for Problem 1 as:
Lemma 2 For any adversary B, there is a probabilistic machine E, whose running time is essentially the same as that of B, such that for any security parameter λ, Adv
Proof. Problem 1 is essentially same as Basic Problem 1 in [23] , where the intractability of the problem is reduced to that of DLIN. Therefore, Lemma 2 is proven in a similar manner as the reduction lemmas in [23] . , n) , where 
Definition 9 (Problem 2) Problem 2 is to guess
Proof. Problem 2 is essentially same as Basic Problem 2 in [23] , where the intractability of the problem is reduced to that of DLIN. Therefore, Lemma 3 is proven in a similar manner as the reduction lemmas in [23] . , n) , where 
Definition 10 (Problem 3) Problem 3 is to guess
β, given (param V , B, B * , {h * β,i , e i , f i } i=1,...,n ) R ← G P3 β (1 λG P3 β (1 λ , n) : (param V , B, B * ) R ← G IPE ob (1 λ , 4n + 2), B := (b 0 , . . . , b n , b 3n+1 , . . . , b 4n+1 ), B * := (b * 0 , . . . , b * n , b * 2n+1 , . . . , b * 4n+1 ), τ, δ 0 , ω , ω , κ , κ U ← F q , for i = 1, . . . , n; n+1 n n n 1 h * 0,i := ( 0 n+1 , τ e i , 0 n , δ 0 e i , 0 ) B * h * 1,i := ( 0 n+1 , 0 n , τ e i , δ 0 e i , 0 ) B * e i := ( 0 n+1 , ω e i , ω e i , 0 n , 0 ) B , f i := ( 0 n+1 , κ e i , κ e i , 0 n , 0 ) B , return (param V , B, B * , {h * β,i , e i , f i } i=1,...,n ),
Lemma 4 For any adversary B, there is a probabilistic machine E, whose running time is essentially the same as that of B, such that for any security parameter λ, Adv
P3 B (λ) ≤ Adv DLIN E (λ)+ 8/q.
Lemma 5 (Lemma 3 in [23]) For
p ∈ F q , let C p := {( x, v)| x · v = p} ⊂ V × V * where V is n-dimensional vector space F n q , and V * its dual. For all ( x, v) ∈ C p , for all ( r, w) ∈ C p , Pr [ xU = r ∧ vZ = w] = Pr [ xZ = r ∧ vU = w] = 1 C p , where Z U ← GL(n, F q ), U := (Z −1 ) T .
Lemma 6
For any adversary A, there exists a probabilistic machine B 1 , whose running time is essentially the same as that of A, such that for any security parameter λ, |Adv 
Lemma 7 For any adversary A, |Adv
(2-(h−1)-4) A (λ) − Adv (2-h-1) A (λ)| ≤ 2/q.
Lemma 8 For any adversary A, there exists a probabilistic machine B 2-1 , whose running time is essentially the same as that of A, such that for any security parameter λ, |Adv
(2-h-1) A (λ) − Adv (2-h-2) A (λ)| ≤ Adv P2 B 2-h-1 (λ), where B 2-h-1 (·) := B 2-1 (h, ·).
Lemma 9 For any adversary A, |Adv
(2-h-2) A (λ) − Adv (2-h-3) A (λ)| ≤ 8/q.
Lemma 10 For any adversary A, there exists a probabilistic machine B 2-2 , whose running time is essentially the same as that of A, such that for any security parameter λ, |Adv
(2-h-3) A (λ) − Adv (2-h-4) A (λ)| ≤ Adv P3 B 2-h-2 (λ), where B 2-h-2 (·) := B 2-2 (h, ·).
Lemma 11 For any adversary A, |Adv
(2-ν-4) A (λ) − Adv (3) A (λ)| ≤ 1/q.
Lemma 12 For any adversary A, Adv
A Variant for Achieving Shorter Public and Secret Keys
A variant of the proposed (basic) IPE scheme with the same security, that achieves a shorter (O(n)-size) master public key and shorter (O(1)-size) secret keys (excluding the description of v), can be constructed by combining with the techniques in [24] , where n is the dimension of vectors of the IPE scheme. This variant also enjoys more efficient decryption. Here, we show this variant. See the security proof of this scheme in the full version of [24] .
Key Ideas in Constructing the Proposed IPE Scheme
We will explain key ideas in constructing the efficient IPE scheme.
First, we will show how short secret-keys and efficient decryption can be achieved in our scheme. Here, we will use a simplified (or toy) version of the proposed IPE scheme, for which the security is no more ensured in the standard model under the DLIN assumption. A ciphertext in the simplified IPE scheme consists of one vector element, c 1 ∈ G n+1 , and c 2 ∈ G T . A secret-key consists of one vector element, k * ∈ G n+1 . Therefore, to achieve constant-size secret-keys, we have to compress k * ∈ G n+1 to a constant size in n (as long as the description of the vector v is not considered a part of the secret-key). We now employ a special form of basis generation matrix, X := 
. Let a secret-key as-
. That is, a secret-key (excluding v) can be just three group elements, or the size is constant in n. Let B := (b i ) be the dual orthonormal basis of B * := (b * i ), and B be the (master) public key in the simplified IPE scheme. We also set a ciphertext for x as c 1 : 
. That is, n−1 scalar multiplications in G and three pairing operations are enough for computing e(c 1 , k * ). Therefore, only a small number of pairing operations are required for decryption.
We then explain how our full IPE scheme is constructed on the above-mentioned simplified IPE scheme. The target of designing the full IPE scheme is to achieve the adaptively and fully attribute-hiding security under the DLIN assumption. Here, we adopt a strategy similar to that of Section 4, in which the extended dual system encryption methodology is employed in a modular or hierarchical manner. That is, two top level assumptions, the security of Problems 1, 2, and 3 are directly used in the dual system encryption methodology and these assumptions are reduced to a primitive assumption, the DLIN assumption.
To meet the requirements for applying to the extended dual system encryption methodology and reducing to the DLIN assumption, the underlying vector space as well as the basis generator matrix X is (almost) five times greater than that of the above-mentioned simplified scheme. For example, 
. , n).
Using a similar technique as above, k * can be compressed to 11 (= 1 + 2 × 5) group elements, and 5(n − 1) scalar multiplications in G and 11 pairing operations are enough for computing e(c 1 , k * ) in decryption.
Construction and Security
Let N := 5n + 1 and
We note that L + (5, n, F q ) is a subgroup of GL(N, F q ). Random dual orthonormal basis generator G
ZIPE,SK ob
below is used as a subroutine in the proposed IPE. Here, we assume that input vector, v := (v 1 , . . . , v n ), has an index l (1 ≤ l ≤ n − 1) with v l = 0, and that input vector, x := (x 1 , . . . , x n ), satisfies x n = 0. 
Remark 2 Let b
* 0 := ( B * 0,0 , 0 n−1 , B * 0,1 , . . . , 0 n−1 , B * 0,5 ), ⎛ ⎜ ⎜ ⎝ b * (i−1)n+1 . . . b * in ⎞ ⎟ ⎟ ⎠ := ⎛ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎝ B * i,0,1 B * i,1 B * i,1,1 . . . . . . . . . B * i,0,n−1 B * i,1 B * i,1,n−1 B * i,0,n B * i,1,n · · · B * i,5 B * i,5,1 . . . . . .Setup(1 λ , n) : (param n , B, {B * 0,0 , B * 0,j , B * i,0,l , B * i,j , B * i,j,l } i,j=1,...,5;l=1,...,n ) R ← G ZIPE,SK ob (1 λ , 5, n), B := (b 0 , . . . , b n , b 4n+1 , . . . , b 5n ), return pk := (1 λ , param n , B), sk := {B * 0,0 , B * 0,j , B * i,0,l , B * i,j , B * i,j,l } i=1,4;j=1,..,5;l=1,..,n . KeyGen(pk, sk, v) : σ, η U ← F q , K * 0 := B * 0,0 + n l=1 v l (σB * 1,0,l + ηB * 4,0,l ), K * 1,j := σB * 1,j + ηB * 4,j , K * 2,j := B * 0,j + n l=1 v l (σB * 1,j,l + ηB * 4,j,l ) for j = 1, .., 5, return sk v := ( v, K * 0 , {K * 1,j , K * 2,j } j=1,...,5 ). Enc(pk, m, x) : ω, ζ U ← F q , ϕ U ← F n q , c 1 := ( ζ, n ω x , 2n 0 2n , n 0 n , n ϕ ) B , c 2 := g ζ T m, return ct x := (c 1 , c 2 ). Dec(pk, sk v := ( v, K * 0 , {K * 1,j , K * 2,j } j=1,...,5 ), ct x := (c 1 , c 2 )) : Parse c 1 as a (5n + 1)-tuple (C 0 , . . . , C 5n ) ∈ G 5n+1 , D j := n−1 l=1 v l C (j−1)n+l for j = 1, . . . , 5, F := e(C 0 , K * 0 ) · 5 j=1 e(D j , K * 1,j ) · e(C jn , K * 2,j ) , return m := c 2 /F. Remark 3 A part of output of Setup(1 λ , n), {B * 0,0 , B * 0,j , B * i,0,l , B * i,j , B * i,j,l } i=1Dec (pk, sk v := ( v, K * 0 , {K * 1,j , K * 2,j } j=1,...,5 ), ct x := (c 1 , c 2 )) :k * := ( n K * 0 , v 1 K * 1,1 , .., v n−1 K * 1,1 , K * 2,1 , . . . , n v 1 K * 1,5 , .., v n−1 K * 1,5 , K * 2,5 ), that is, k * = (1, n σ v, 2n 0 2n , n η v n 0 n ) B * , F := e(c 1 , k * ), return m := c 2 /F.
Theorem 2 The proposed IPE scheme is adaptively attribute-hiding against chosen plaintext attacks under the DLIN assumption. For any adversary A, there exist probabilistic machines
E 0-1 , E 0-2 , E 1-1 , E 1-2-1 and E 1-2-2 ,
whose running times are essentially the same as that of A, such that for any security parameter λ,
, ν is the maximum number of A's key queries and := (29ν + 17)/q. Table 2 compares the proposed IPE schemes in Sections 4 and 5 with existing attribute-hiding IPE schemes in [19, 22, 20, 23] . [19, 22, 20, 23] , where |G| and |G T | represent size of an element of G and that of G T , respectively. AH, PK, SK, CT, GSD, DSP and eDDH stand for attribute-hiding, master public key, secret key, ciphertext, general subgroup decision [1] , decisional subspace problem [22] , and extended decisional Diffie-Hellman [20] 
Comparison
O(n)|G| O(n 2 )|G| O(n 2 )|G| O(n 2 )|G| O(n 2 )|G| O(n)|G| SK size (2n + 1)|G| (n + 3)|G| (2n + 3)|G| (3n + 2)|G| (4n + 2)|G| 11|G| CT size (2n + 1)|G| + |G T | (n + 3)|G| + |G T | (2n + 3)|G| + |G T | (3n + 2)|G| + |G T | (4n + 2)|G| + |G T | (5n + 1)|G| + |G T |
Extension to HIPE
The proposed IPE scheme is extended to a hierarchical IPE (HIPE) scheme by applying the similar construction given in Appendix H.4 in the full version of [23] .
Dual Orthonormal Basis Generator
We describe random dual orthonormal basis generator G HIPE ob below, which is used as a subroutine in the proposed HIPE scheme.
We note that
Special Notations for the Proposed HIPE
To express our delegation mechanisms in the HIPE compactly, we will use the same notation as in [23] .
Since we use dual orthonormal basis generator 
and our HIPEs are constructed on the one vector space V ( ∼ = G N ) with special bases induced by X. In other words, the matrix X gives direct sum decomposition
. Based on this isomorphism, i.e., embedding of V t (resp. V * t ) in V (resp. V * ), we define the following notations as:
and e t,j := (
and all the above notations are applied to the case with {B * t } t=0,...,d instead of {B t } t=0,...,d
Construction
In the description of the scheme, we assume that the first coordinates, x i,1 , of input vectors,
ψ, s dec,t , s ran,1,j,t , θ dec,t , θ ran,1,j,t U ← F q for t = 1, . . . , , s del,(τ,ι),t , s ran,2,τ,t , θ del,(τ,ι),t , θ ran,2,τ,t U ← F q for t = 1, . . . , + 1,
Lemma 13 shows the distribution of delegated keys and that of the corresponding freshlygenerated keys are equivalent (except with negligible probability). KeyGen(pk, sk, ( v 1 , . . . , v ) ), the distribution of sk +1 generated by Delegate(pk, sk , v +1 ) is equivalent to that of sk +1 generated by KeyGen (pk, sk, ( v 1 , . . . , v , v +1 )) except with probability at most (2d − 2 + 3)/q. Lemma 13 is proven in the same manner as that in the full version of [23] .
Lemma 13 If sk is generated by
Security
Theorem 3 The proposed HIPE scheme is adaptively (fully) attribute-hiding against chosen plaintext attacks under the DLIN assumption.
For any adversary A, there exist probabilistic machines E 0-1 , E 0-2 , E 1-1 , E 1-2-1 and E 1-2-2 , whose running times are essentially the same as that of A, such that for any security parameter λ, The weakly attribute-hiding security of HIPE in the full version of [23] implies the security of our HIPE with t = 0 as in Theorem 1, and the security with t = 1 is proven in a similar manner as Lemma 1.
A Some Key Techniques on DPVS
A.1 Summary
We now briefly explain our approach, DPVS, constructed on symmetric pairing groups (q, G, G T , G, e), where q is a prime, G and G T are cyclic groups of order q, G is a generator of G, e : G × G → G T is a non-degenerate bilinear pairing operation, and e(G, G) = 1. Here we denote the group operation of G by addition and G T by multiplication, respectively. Note that this construction also works on asymmetric pairing groups (in this paper, we use symmetric pairing groups for simplicity of description). 
Vector space
V: V := N G × · · · × G, whose element is expressed by N -dimensional vector, x := (x 1 G, . . . , x N G) (x i ∈ F q for i = 1, . . .
, N).
Canonical base
Pairing operation: e(x, y)
Intractable problem: One of the most natural decisional problems in this approach is the decisional subspace problem [21] . It is to tell v :
Trapdoor: Although the decisional subspace problem is assumed to be intractable, it can be efficiently solved by using trapdoor
we can tell v from u using t * since e(v, t * ) = 1 and e(u, t * ) = 1 with high probability.
Advantage of this approach:
Higher dimensional vector treatment of bilinear pairing groups have been already employed in literature especially in the areas of IBE, ABE and BE (e.g., [5, 2, 9, 11, 17, 27] ). The major drawback of this approach is the easily decomposable property over A (i.e., the decisional subspace problem is easily solved). That is, it is easy to decompose
In contrast, our approach employs basis B, which is linearly transformed from A using a secret random matrix X ∈ F n×n q . A remarkable property over B is that it seems hard to decompose x i b i from P := x 1 b 1 + · · · x N b N (and the decisional subspace problem seems intractable). In addition, the secret matrix X (and the dual orthonormal basis B * of V) can be used as a source of the trapdoors to the decomposability (and distinguishability for the decisional subspace problem through the pairing operation over B and B * as mentioned above). The hard decomposability (and indistinguishability) and its trapdoors are ones of the key tricks in this paper. Note that composite order pairing groups are often employed with similar tricks such as hard decomposability (and indistinguishability) of a composite order group to the prime order subgroups and its trapdoors through factoring (e.g., [19, 28] ).
A.2 Dual Pairing Vector Spaces by Direct Product of Asymmetric Pairing Groups
Definition 11 "Asymmetric bilinear pairing groups" (q, := (q, G 1 , G 2 , G T , G 1 , G 2 , e) with security parameter λ. 
Definition 12 "Dual pairing vector spaces (DPVS)"
(q, V, V * , G T , A, A * , e) by direct product of asymmetric pairing groups param G := (q, G 1 , G 2 , G T , G 1 , G 2 , e
[Canonical maps] Linear transformation
This completes the proof of Lemma 4. 3-α (α = 0, 1, 2) ) We define Exp-3-α instance generator,
Definition 13 (Experiment
G Exp-3 α (1 λ , n), where G Exp-3 α (1 λ , n) : (param V , B, B * ) R ← G IPE ob (1 λ , 4n + 2), B := (b 0 , . . . , b n , b 3n+1 , . . . , b 4n+1 ), B * := (b * 0 , . . . , b * n , b * 2n+1 , . . . , b * 4n+1 ), τ, τ , δ 0 , ω , ω , κ , κ U ← F q , for i = 1, . . . , n; n+1 n n n 1 h * 0,i := ( 0 n+1 , τ e i , 0 nt , δ 0 e i , 0 ) B * h * 1,i := ( 0 n+1 , τ e i , τ e i , δ 0 e i , 0 ) B * h * 2,i := ( 0 n+1 , 0 n , τ e i , δ 0 e i , 0 ) B * e i := ( 0 n+1 , ω e i , ω e i , 0 n , 0 ) B , f i := ( 0 n+1 , κ e i , κ e i , 0 n , 0 ) B , return (param V , B, B * , {h * α,i , e i , f i } i=1,...,n ).
For a probabilistic adversary B, we define 3 experiments Exp
3-α
B (α = 0, 1, 2) as follows:
Lemma 14 For any adversary B, for any security parameter λ, |Pr Exp
where τ := −θτ, ω := ω + θω and κ := κ + θκ , which are independently and uniformly distributed since θ, ω , κ U ← F q except for the case τ = 0. That is, the joint distribution for Exp. 3-0 and that for Exp. 3-1 are equivalent except with probability 1/q.
Lemma 15
For any adversary B, there is a probabilistic machine C, whose running time is essentially the same as that of B, for any security parameter λ, Pr Exp
Proof. In order to prove Lemma 15, we construct a probabilistic machine C against Problem 2 using a machine B distinguishing the experiment Exp , b 2n+1 , . . . , b 3n , b n+1 , . . . , b 2n , b 1 , . . . , b n , b 3n+1 , . . . , b 4n+1 ), . . . , d n , d 3n+1 , . . . , d 4n+1 ) = (b 0 , b 2n+1 , . . . , b 3n , b 3n+1 , . . . , b 4n+1 ), 
..,n ) to B, and receives β ∈ {0, 1}. C then outputs β . Then, 
..,n ) has the same distribution as the output of the generator G Exp-3 1
(1 λ , n)) when β = 1 (resp. β = 0) except with probability 1/q. This completes the proof of Lemma 15.
Proof of Lemma 6
Lemma 6. For any adversary A, there exists a probabilistic machine B 1 , whose running time is essentially the same as that of A, such that for any security parameter λ, |Adv
Proof. In order to prove Lemma 6, we construct a probabilistic machine B 1 against Problem 1 using an adversary A in a security game (Game 0' or 1) as a black box as follows:
2. B 1 plays a role of the challenger in the security game against adversary A. 4. When a key query is issued for vector v, B 1 answers normal key k * with Eq. (2) , that is computed using B * of the Problem 1 instance.
5. When B 1 receives an encryption query with challenge plaintexts (m (0) , m (1) ) and vectors ( x (0) , x (1) ) from A, B 1 computes the challenge ciphertext (c 1 , c 2 ) such that, Proof. We will consider the distribution of c 1 .
When β = 0, ciphertext c 1 generated in step 5 is 
. This completes the proof of Lemma 6.
Proof of Lemma 7
Lemma 7. For any adversary A, |Adv 
Proof.
Case that h = 1, i.e., proof for |Adv (1) A (λ) − Adv (1) ) is:
where r U ← F 2n q \ { 0}, and all the other variables are generated as in Game 1. Proof. We will consider the joint distribution of c 1 and k * . Ciphertext c 1 generated in step 5 is
where ζ, ω, σ, ω 0 , ω 1 , ϕ ∈ F q are uniformly and independently distributed.
When β = 0, secret key k * generated in case (b) of step 4 or 6 is
where η := (v 1 δ 0 + η 1 , . . . , v n δ 0 + η n ) ∈ F n q Then, δ ∈ F q and η ∈ F n q are uniformly and independently distributed. Therefore, generated c 1 and k * have the same joint distribution as in Game 2-h-1.
When β = 1, secret key k * generated in case (b) of step 4 or 6 is
where η := (v 1 δ 0 + η 1 , . . . , v n δ 0 + η n ) ∈ F n q Then, δ ∈ F q and η ∈ F n q are uniformly and independently distributed. Therefore, generated c 1 and k * have the same joint distribution as in Game 2-h-2.
From Claim 6, Adv 6. When a key query is issued by A after the encryption query, B 2-2 executes the same procedure as that of step 4.
7.
A finally outputs bit b . If b = b , B 2-2 outputs β := 1. Otherwise, B 2-2 outputs β := 0.
Claim 9
The distribution of the view of adversary A in the above-mentioned game simulated by B 2-2 given a Problem 3 instance with β ∈ {0, 1} is the same as that in Game 2-h-3 (resp. Game 2-h-4) if β = 0 (resp. β = 1).
Proof. We consider the joint distribution of c 1 and k * . Ciphertext c 1 generated in step 5 is , ω x (0) + κ x (1) , ω x (0) + κ x (1) , 0 n , ϕ) B where ζ, ω, ω , ω , κ , κ , ϕ ∈ F q are uniformly and independently distributed.
where η := (v 1 δ 0 + η 1 , . . . , v n δ 0 + η n ) ∈ F n q Then, σ, τ ∈ F q and η ∈ F n q are uniformly and independently distributed. Therefore, generated c 1 and k * have the same joint distribution as in Game 2-h-3.
where η := (v 1 δ 0 + η 1 , . . . , v n δ 0 + η n ) ∈ F n q Then, σ, τ ∈ F q and η ∈ F n q are uniformly and independently distributed. Therefore, generated c 1 and k * have the same joint distribution as in Game 2-h-4.
From Claim 9, Adv
(λ). This completes the proof of Lemma 10.
Proof of Lemma 11
Lemma 11. For any adversary A, |Adv 
